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THE OBLIGING SHELL: AN INFORMAL 




We live in an era in which women and people of color compose 
and literally define both this society's underclass and its most under-
served population. Remedying this therefore ought to be, must be, 
this society's most pressing area of representational responsibility; not 
only in terms of fairly privatized issues like "more pro bono," or more 
lawyers taking on more cases of particular sorts, but in really examin-
ing the ways in which the law operates to omit women and people of 
color at all levels, including the most subtle - to omit them from the 
literature of the law, from the ranks oflawyers, and to omit them from 
the numbers of those served by its interests. 
In this regard, I have been thinking a lot about the recent Supreme 
Court decision in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 1 which 
presented a challenge, as well as its own model of resistance, to the 
pursuit of "[p ]roper findings ... necessary to define both the scope of 
the injury [in race and gender cases] and the extent of the remedy."2 
That case, if you will recall, involved a minority set-aside program 
in the awarding of municipal contracts. The city of Richmond, Vir-
ginia, with a black population of just over 50%, set a 30% goal in the 
awarding of city construction contracts, based on its findings that lo-
cal, state and national patterns of discrimination had resulted in all 
but complete lack of access for minority-owned businesses. In fact, 
theretofore, only 0.67% of municipal contracts had been awarded to 
minority-owned businesses. The Supreme Court held: 
We, therefore, hold that the city has failed to demonstrate a compel-
ling interest in apportioning public contracting opportunities on the basis 
of race. To accept Richmond's claim that past societal discrimination 
alone can serve as the basis for rigid racial preferences would be to open 
the door to competing claims for "remedial relief" for every disadvan-
taged group. The dream of a Nation of equal citizens in a society where 
• Associate Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin School of Law. B.A. 1972, Wellesley 
College; J.D. 1975, Harvard. - Ed. 
1. 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989). 
2. 109 S. Ct. at 730. 
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race is irrelevant to personal opportunity and achievement would be lost 
in a mosaic of shifting preferences based on inherently unmeasurable 
claims of past wrongs. "Courts would be asked to evaluate the extent of 
the prejudice and consequent harm suffered by various minority groups. 
Those whose societal injury is thought to exceed some arbitrary level of 
tolerability then would be entitled to preferential classifications .... " 
We think such a result would be contrary to both the letter and spirit of 
a constitutional provision whose central command is equality.3 
What strikes me most about this holding are the rhetorical devices 
the court employs to justify its outcome: 
(1) It sets up a "slippery slope" at the bottom of which lie 
hordes-in-waiting of warring barbarians: an "open door" through 
which would flood the "competing claims" of "every disadvantaged 
group." It problematizes by conjuring mythic dangers. 
(2) It describes situations for which there are clear, hard statisti-
cal data as "inherently unmeasurable." It puts in the diminutive that 
which is not; it makes infinite what in fact is limited. 
(3) It puts itself in passive relation to the purported "arbitrari-
ness" of others' perceptions of the intolerability of their circumstances 
(i.e., "those whose societal injury is thought to exceed some arbitrary 
level of tolerability."4) 
These themes are reiterated throughout the opinion: societal dis-
crimination is "too amorphous";5 racial goals are labelled "unyield-
ing";6 goals are labelled "quotas";7 testimony becomes mere 
"recitation";8 legislative purpose and action become "simple legislative 
assurances of good intention";9 lower court opinion is disregarded as 
just "blind judicial deference"; 10 and statistics are rendered "general-
izations."11 This adjectival dismissiveness alone is sufficient to hypno-
tize the reader into believing that the "assumption that white prime 
contractors simply will not hire minority firms" is completely 
"unsupported." 12 
And as I think about the Croson opinion, I cannot help but marvel 
at how, against a backdrop of richly textured facts and proof on both 
3. 109 S. Ct. at 727 (emphasis added; citation omitted) (quoting Regents of the University of 
California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 296-97 (1978) (Powell, J.)). 
4. 109 S. Ct. at 723 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 296-97 (Powell, J.)). 
5. 109 S. Ct. at 724. 
6. 109 S. Ct. at 716 passim. 
7. 109 S. Ct. at 719, 722, 724, 729. 
8. 109 S. Ct. at 724. 
9. 109 S. Ct. at 725. 
10. 109 S. Ct. at 724. 
11. 109 S. Ct. at 725. 
12. 109 S. Ct. at 725. 
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local and national scales, in a city where more than 50% of the popu-
lation is black and in which fewer than 1 % of contracts are awarded to 
minorities or minority-owned businesses, interpretive artifice alone al-
lowed this narrow vision that not only was 30% too great a set-aside, 
but that there was no proof of discrimination. 
I think, moreover, that the rhetorical devices that accomplished 
this astonishing holding are comprehensible less from the perspective 
of traditionally conceived constitutional interpretive standards -
whether rational relationship or strict scrutiny - than by turning to 
interpretive standards found in private law. The process by which the 
Court consistently diminished the importance of real facts, real 
figures, is paralleled only by the process of rendering "extrinsic" other-
wise probative evidence under the Parol Evidence Rule. 13 
In particular, I am struck by the Court's use of the word "equal-
ity" in the last line of its holding. 14 It seems an extraordinarily narrow 
use of "equality," when it excludes from consideration so much clear 
inequality. It, again, resembles the process by which the Parol Evi-
dence Rule limits the meaning of documents or words by placing be-
yond the bounds of reference anything that is inconsistent, or, 
depending on the circumstances, even that which is supplementary. It 
is this lawyerly language game of exclusion and omission that is the 
subject of the rest of this essay. 
II. A QUICK REVIEW OF THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE 
Before I went into teaching, I practiced consumer protection. I 
remember one trial in particular, a suit against a sausage manufacturer 
for selling impure and contaminated products. The manufacturer in-
sisted that the word "sausage" meant "pig meat and lots of impuri-
ties." Here are my notes from my final argument to the jury: 
You have this thing called a sausage-making machine. You put pork 
and spices in at the top and crank it up, and because it is a sausage-
making machine, what comes out the other end is a sausage. Over time, 
everyone knows that anything that comes out of the sausage-making 
machine is known as a sausage. In fact, there is law passed that says that 
it's indisputably sausage. 
One day, we throw in a few small rodents of questionable pedigree 
and a teddy bear and a chicken. We crank the machine up and wait to 
see what comes out the other end. (1) Do we prove the validity of the 
machine if we call the product a sausage? (2) Or do we enlarge and 
enhance the meaning of "sausage" if we call the product a sausage? (3) 
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 43 (1979); U.C.C. § 2-202 (1987). 
14. 109 S. Ct. at 727. 
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Or do we have any success in breaking out of the bind if we call it some-
thing different from "sausage"? 
In fact, I'm not sure it makes any difference whether we call it sau-
sage or if we scramble the letters of the alphabet over this . . . this thing 
that comes out, full of sawdust and tiny claws. What will make a differ-
ence, however, is a recognition of our shifting relation to the word "sau-
sage," by either: 
(1) enlarging the authority of sausage-makers and enhancing the 
awesome, cruel inevitability of the workings of sausage machines - i.e., 
everything they touch turns to sausage or else it doesn't exist; or by 
(2) expanding the definition of sausage itself to encompass a wealth 
of variation: chicken, rodent, or teddy bear sausage; or, finally, by 
(3) challenging our own comprehension of what it is we really 
mean by sausage - i.e., by making clear the consensual limits of sau-
sage, and reacquainting ourselves with the sources of its authority and 
legitimation. 
Realizing that there are at least three different ways to relate to the 
facts of this case, to this product, this thing, is to define and acknowledge 
your role as jury and as trier of fact; is to acknowledge your own partici-
pation in the creation of reality. 
(At this point there was an objection, overruled, from the sausage-
maker's lawyer based upon too much critical theory in the 
courtroom.) 
[Sausage-maker's] suit is an attempt to devour the meaning of justice 
in much the same way that this machine has devoured the last shred of 
common-sense meaning from sausage itself. But the ultimate interpre-
tive choice is yours: will you allow the machine such great transforma-
tive power that everything which goes in it is robbed of its inherency, so 
that nonconformity ceases to exist? Or will you choose the second alter-
native, to allow the product to be so powerful, that "sausage" becomes 
all-encompassing, so engorged with alternative meaning as to fill a pur-
poseful machine with ambiguity and undecidability. Or will you wave 
that so-called sausage, sawdust and tiny claws spilling from both ends, in 
the face of that machine and shout: this is not Justice! For now is the 
time to revolt against the tyranny of definition-machines and insist on 
your right to name what your senses well know, to describe what you 
perceive to be the limits of sausage-justice, and the beyond of which is 
this thing, this clear injustice. 
(There was a spattering of applause from the gallery as I thanked 
the ladies and gentlemen of the jury and returned to my seat at counsel 
table.) 
Since that time, I have used sausages to illustrate and illuminate a 
whole range of problems: I just substitute "Constitution" or "equal-
ity" or "black" or "freedom of speech" instead of the word "sausage." 
It helps me think about a whole range of word-entanglements, on the-
oretical as well as prosaic levels. For one thing, the three levels of 
meaning correspond to 
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(1) a positivist mode of interpretation in which the literal mean-
ing of words is given great authority; 
(2) a legal realist, as well as mainstream feminist and civil rights 
mode of interpretation (squeezing room into meaning for "me too"); 
and 
(3) what is often (inaccurately) attributed to a "nihilistic" critical 
interpretive stance ("I don't know what it is, but I do know what it 
isn't"). I think a better way of describing this last category is that it is 
that part of interpretive discourse that explores the limits of meaning, 
that gives meaning by knowing its bounds. (I think, by the way, that 
an accurate understanding of critical theory requires recognition of the 
way in which the concept of "indeterminacy" questions the authority 
of definitional cages; it is not "nihilism," but a challenge to contextual-
ize, by empowering community standards and the democratization of 
interpretation.) 
It also corresponds to the three levels of "integration" of contracts 
under the Parol Evidence Rule: (1) Written contracts that are found 
by a judge to be "totally integrated" are limited to their "plain mean-
ing," 15 just as the dominant social contract as understood by the Rea-
gan Court is limited in its meaning and will not suffer any additions or 
variation of interpretation from evidence of prior or contemporaneous 
circumstances, events, or sources of meaning. (2) Contracts that are 
found to be only "partially integrated" allow for multiplicities of 
meaning and may have their terms supplemented by additional extrin-
sic evidence. 16 (3) And contracts that are found "not integrated" at all 
may be altogether undone by a range of possible meaning that includes 
the wholly inconsistent.17 
Law and life are all about the constant assessment of where on the 
scale one's words are meant; and by which level of the scale to evalu-
ate and interpret the words of others. I think however, that the game 
is more complicated than choosing a single level in which to settle for 
all time. That truth exists on all three levels is the theme that I want 
to pursue from here. 
III. THE TRUTH ABOUT EQUALITY 
I think of situational sausage-machine analysis as a way of reexam-
ining what is lost by too narrow interpretive ideologies, and of redis-
covering those injuries made invisible by description of them beyqnd 
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 215 (1979). 
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 216 (1979); see also u.c.c. § 2-202 (1987). 
17. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 215 (1979). 
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the bounds of legal discourse. For example, affirmative action pro-
grams, of which minority set-asides are but one example, were 
designed to remedy a segregationist view of equality in which positivis-
tic categories of race reigned supreme. "White" had an ironclad defi-
nition that was the equivalent of "good," or "deserving." "Black" had 
an ironclad definition that was the equivalent of "bad," or unworthy 
of inclusion. 
While the most virulent examples of such narrow human and lin-
guistic interpretations have been removed from code books, much of 
this unconsciously filtered vision remains with us in subtler form. An 
example of this subtler manifestation may be found in the so-called 
"Ujamaa House incidents" that took place on Stanford University's 
campus last October. 
A brief bit of background is in order first: 
Ujamaa House is one of several "theme" houses at Stanford, set up 
with the idea of exposing students to a variety of live-in cultural and 
racial exchanges. There is an Hispanic theme house, a Japanese theme 
house; Ujamaa is the African-American theme house. 
On the night of September 29, 1988, a white student, identified 
only as "Fred," and a black student, called "QC," had an argument 
about whether or not the composer Beethoven "had black blood." QC 
insisted that he did; Fred thought the very idea was "preposterous." 
The following night, the white students said that they got drunk and 
decided to color a poster of Beethoven to represent a black stereotype. 
They posted it outside the room of [QC], the black student who had 
originally made the claim about Beethoven's race. 
Later, on Oct[ober] 14, after the defacing but before the culprits had 
been identified, a black fraternity's poster hanging in the dorm was em-
blazoned with the word "niggers." No one has admitted to that act, 
which prompted an emergency house staff meeting that eventually led to 
the identification [of Fred as one] of the students who had defaced the 
Beethoven poster. ts 
In subsequent months, there was an exhaustive study conducted by 
the university, which issued a report of its fact findings on January 17, 
1989.19 There were three things about Fred's explanation that I found 
particularly interesting in that report: 
(1) Fred said that he was upset by all the emphasis on race, on 
difference. "He wanted others to 'relax and focus on the humanistic 
aspect of everyone' and could not see why race or diversity was such a 
18. O'Toole, Ujamaa Incident a "Gripping Study" in Race Relations, Stan. Univ. Campus 
Rep., Jan. 18, 1989, at 1, col. 1, 19, cols. 1 & 2. 
19. Board of Trustees, Stanford Univ., Final Report on Recent Incidents at Ujamaa House 
(1989). 
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'big deal.' "2° I was struck by the word boxes by which "race," "dif-
ference," and "humanity" were structured to be inconsistent concepts. 
(2) Fred was a descendant of German Jews, and was schooled in 
England. Fred described incidents of what he referred to as "teasing" 
- and what I would call humiliation, even torture - by his school-
mates about his being Jewish. They called him miserly, and his being 
a Jew was referred to as a weakness. Fred said that he had learned not 
to mind it and indicated that the poster defacement at Ujamaa House 
had been in the spirit of that teasing. He wondered that the black 
students couldn't respond to it in the "spirit" in which it was meant -
nothing serious, just "humor as a release." It was just a little message, 
he said, to stop all this divisive black stuff and be human.21 In these 
facts, Fred appeared to me to be someone who was humiliated into 
conformity, and who in the spirit of the callousness and displaced pain 
which humiliation ultimately engenders, passed it on. 
(3) Fred found the assertion that Beethoven was black not just 
annoying but preposterous. In the wake of the defacement, he was 
assigned to do some reading on the subject and found that indeed Bee-
thoven was mulatto. This discovery upset him deeply, so deeply, in 
fact, that his entire relation to the music changed:22 "Fred said that 
'before [he] knew Beethoven was black he had had a certain image of 
Beethoven and hearing he was black changed his perception of Bee-
thoven and made him see Beethoven as the person he drew in the 
picture.' " 
Ultimately, Stanford's Disciplinary Board found no injury to QC 
and recommended no discipline of Fred because it was felt that would 
victimize him, depriving him of his first amendment rights. As to this 
remedy, I was struck by the following issues: 
(1) The privatization of remedy to QC alone; 
(2) The invisibility of any injury to anyone, whether to QC or to 
the Stanford community, whether to whites or to blacks; and 
(3) The pitting of the first amendment against other forms of in-
jury - i.e., if it's speech then there can't be any harm emanating from 
it.23 
As in Croson's definition of "equality," I think that the resolution 
20. Id. at 2. 
21. Id. at 2. 
22. Id. at 5. 
23. This is always such a hard point to make without being misunderstood: I am not arguing 
against the first amendment; what I am insisting upon, however, is some appreciation for the 
power of words and for the other forms of power abuses that may be lurking behind the "de· 
fense" of free speech. 
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of the Ujamaa House incident rested on a definition of "harm" that 
was so circumscribed in scope as to conceal from any consideration -
legal or otherwise - a range of serious but "extrinsic" harms felt by 
the decisionmakers to be either inconsistent with the first amendment, 
or beside the point ("additional to," according to the Parol Evidence 
Rule). To illustrate this point, I will try to recount my own sense of 
the injury in this case. 
I relate to the Beethoven injury in the following way: Personally. 
I am the first black female [lots of things] [in lots of circumstances]. I 
am a first black pioneer just for speaking my mind. The only problem 
is that every generation of my family has been a first black something 
or other, an experimental black, a "different" black - a hope, a can-
dle and a credit to our race. Most of my black friends' families are full 
of generations of pioneers and exceptions to the rule. (How else would 
we have grown up to such rarified heights of professionalism? Noth-
ing is ever really done in one generation, or alone.) It is not that we 
are that rare in time, it is that over time our accomplishments have 
been co-opted and have disappeared; the issue is when can we stop 
being perceived as "firsts"? I wonder when I and the millions of other 
people of color who have done great and noble things and small and 
courageous things and creative and scientific things - when our 
achievements will become generalizations about our race and seen as 
contributions to the larger culture, rather than exceptions to the rule, 
as privatized and isolated abnormalities. (If only there were more of 
you! I hear a lot. The truth is, there are lots more of me, and better of 
me, and always have been.) 
The most deeply offending part of the injury of the Beethoven de-
facement is its message that if I ever manage to create something as 
significant, as monumental, and as important as Beethoven's music, or 
the literature of the mulatto Alexandre Dumas or the mulatto Alek-
sander Pushkin - if I am that great in genius, and perfect in ability -
then the best reward to which I can aspire, and the most cherishing 
gesture with which my recognition will be preserved, is that I will be 
remembered as white. Maybe even a white man. And perhaps my 
tribe will hold a candle in honor of my black heart over the genera-
tions - for blacks have been teaching white people that Beethoven 
was a mulatto for over a hundred years now - and they will be 
mocked when they try to make some piece of a claim to me. If they do 
press their point, the best that they can hope for is that their tor-
menters will be absolved based on the fact that it was a reasonable 
mistake to assume that I was white: they just didn't know. But it is 
precisely the appropriation of knowledge, the authority of creating ca-
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non, revising memory, of declaring boundary beyond which lies the 
"extrinsic" and beyond which ignorance is reasonably suffered, that is 
the issue. It is not only the individual and isolating fact of that igno-
rance: it is the violence of claiming in a way that denies, of creating 
property that fragments and dehumanizes. 
This should not be understood as a claim that Beethoven's music is 
exclusively black music, or that white people have no claim to its his-
tory or enjoyment; it is about the ability of black and brown and red 
and yellow people to name their rightful contributions to the universe 
of music or any other field. It is the right to claim that we are, after 
all, part of Western Civilization. It is the right to claim our existence. 
The determination that Beethoven was not-black is an unspoken 
determination that he was German and therefore he could not be 
black. To acknowledge his mulatto ancestry is to undo the supposed 
purity of the Germanic empire. It is the sanctification of cultural sym-
bols that are rooted in notions of racial purity. I think that one of the 
most difficult parts of the idea that Beethoven was not pure white has 
to do with the implication that this has for notions for the words of the 
purity of all Western civilization: if Beethoven, that most Aryan of 
musicians, is not really Aryan, if the word "German" also means 
"mulatto," then some of the most powerfully uplifting, inspiring, 
limbically unifying of what we call "Western" moments come crash-
ing down to the aesthetic of vaudevillian blackface. The student who 
defaced the poster said that "before [he] knew Beethoven was black he 
had a certain image of Beethoven and hearing he was black changed 
his perception of Beethoven and made him see Beethoven as the per-
son he drew in the picture. "24 
All of this is precisely the reasoning that leads so many to assume 
that the introduction of African-American, or South American, or 
feminist literature into Stanford's curriculum is a threat to the very 
concepts of what is meant by "Western" or "Civilization." It is in-
deed a threat. The most frightening discovery of all will be the even-
tual realization of the degree to which people of color have always 
been part of Western Civilization. 
When Fred's whole relationship to the music changed once he dis-
covered that Beethoven was black, it made me think of how much my 
students' relationship to me is engineered by my being black; how 
much I am marginalized based on a hierarchy of perception, by my 
relation to definitional canons which exercise superhuman power in 
my life. When Beethoven is no longer Ubermensch, but real and really 
24. Board of Trustees, Stanford Univ., supra note 19, at 5 {bracketed material in original). 
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black, he falls to debasement beneath contempt; for there is no racial 
midpoint between the polarities of adoration and aversion. When 
some first-year law students walk in and see that I am their contracts 
teacher, I have been told that their whole perception of law school 
changes. The failure of Stanford to acknowledge this level of the harm 
in the Ujamaa House incident allows students to deface me. In the 
margins of their notebooks, or unconsciously perhaps, they deface me; 
to them, I "look like a stereotype of a black [person]"25 (as Fred de-
scribed it), not a black academic. They see my brown face and they 
draw lines " 'emphasizing [enlarging]' the lips, and coloring in 'black, 
frizzy hair.' " 26 They add "red eyes, 'to give ... a demonic look.' " 27 
In the margins of their notebooks, I am obliterated. 
IV. THE TRUTH ABOUT NEUTRALITY 
The Beethoven controversy is an example of an analytic paradigm 
in which "white = good and black = bad." While that paradigm 
operated for many years as a construct in United States law, it cannot 
be said to exist as a formal legal matter today. 
Rather, an interpretive shift has occurred, as though our collective 
social reference has been enlarged somewhat, by slipping from what I 
described above as the first level of sausage analysis to the second: by 
going from a totally segregated system to a "partially integrated" one. 
In this brave new world, "white" still retains its ironclad (or paradig-
matic) definition of "good," but a bit of word-stretching is allowed to 
include some few consistent additional others: blacks, whom we all 
now know can be good too, must therefore be "white." Blacks who 
refuse the protective shell of white goodness and insist that they are 
black are inconsistent with the paradigm of goodness, and therefore 
they are bad. As silly as this sounds as a bare-bones schematic, I think 
that it is powerfully hypostatized in our present laws and in Supreme 
Court holdings: this absurd type of twisted thinking, this racism-in-
drag is propounded not just as a theory of "equality" but as a standard 
of "neutrality." (I also think that this schematic is why equality and 
neutrality have become such constant and necessary companions; they 
are two sides of the same coin. "Equal ... "has as its unspoken refer-
ent " ... to whites"; "neutral ... " has as its hidden subtext " ... to 
concerns of color.") 
Consider, for example, the case of the Rockettes. In October 1987, 
25. Id. at 2. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
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the Radio City Music Hall Rockettes hired their first black dancer in 
the history of that troupe. Her position was "to be on call for vacan-
cies." (Who could have thought of a more quintessentially 
postmodern paradox of omission within the discourse of omission?) 
As of December 26, 1987, she had not yet performed, but, it was 
hoped, "she may soon do so."28 Failure to include blacks before this 
was attributed not to racism, but to the desire to maintain the aesthetic 
of "mirror image" uniformity and precision. 29 I read this and saw 
allegory - all of society mirrored in that one statement. 
Mere symmetry, of course, could be achieved by hiring all black 
dancers. It could be achieved by hiring light-skinned black dancers, in 
the tradition of the Cotton Club's grand heyday of condescension. It 
could be achieved by hiring an even number of black dancers and then 
placing them like little black anchors at either end; or like hubcaps at 
the center; or by speckling them throughout the lineup at even inter-
vals, for a nice checkerboard, melting pot effect. . . . It could be 
achieved by letting all the white dancers brown themselves in the sun a 
bit, to match the black dancers - something they were forbidden to 
do for many years, because the owner of the Rockettes didn't want 
them to look "like ... colored girl[s]."30 
There are infinite ways to get a racially mixed lineup to look like a 
mirror image of itself. Hiring one black, however, is not the way to do 
it. Hiring one and sticking her third to the left is a sure way to make 
her stick out. She will stand out like a large freckle and the impreci-
sion of the whole line will devolve upon her. Hiring one black dancer 
and pretending that her color is invisible is the physical embodiment 
of the sort of emptiness and failure of imagination that more abstract 
forms of so-called neutral or "color-blind" remedies represent. As a 
spokeswoman for the company said: "[Race is not] an issue for the 
Rockettes - we're an equal opportunity employer."31 
An issue that is far more difficult to deal with than the simple 
omission of those words which signify racism in the law and in society 
is the underlying yet dominant emotion of racism - i.e., the feeling, 
28. Lambert, Rockettes and Race: Barrier Slips. N.Y. Times, Dec. 26, 1987, at 25, col. 6. 
29. As recently as five years ago, the director of the Rockettes, Violet Holmes, defended 
the all-white line on artistic grounds. She said that the dancers were supposed to be "mirror 
images" of each other, and added: "One or two black girls in the line would definitely 
distract. You would lose the whole look of precision, which is the hallmark of the 
Rockettes." 
Id. at 27, col. 1. 
30. Russell Markert, the late founder of the Rockettes, "acknowledged before his death that 
he ... forbade suntans for a white dancer because 'it would make her look like a colored girl.' " 
Id. 
31. Id. at cols. I & 2. 
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the perception that introducing blacks into a lineup will make it ugly 
("unaesthetic"), imbalanced ("nonuniform") and sloppy ("impre-
cise"). The ghostly power of this perception will limit everything the 
sole black dancer does - it will not matter how precise she is in feet 
and fact, her presence alone will be construed as imprecise; for it is her 
inherency which is unpleasant, conspicuous, unbalancing. 
The example of the Rockettes is a lesson in why the limitation of 
original intent as a standard of constitutional review is problematic, 
particularly where the social text is an "aesthetic of uniformity" - as 
it appears to be in a formalized, strictly-scrutinized but color-blind, 
liberal society. Uniformity nullifies or at best penalizes the individual. 
Noninterpretive devices, extrinsic sources and intuitive means of read-
ing may be the only ways to include the reality of the unwritten, un-
named, nontext of race. 
In Croson, the Supreme Court responded to a version of this latter 
point by proclaiming that the social text, no matter how uniform and 
exclusive, could not be called exclusionary in the absence of proof that 
people of color even want to be recipients of municipal contracts, 32 or 
want to be Rockettes, or whatever. 
But the nature of desire and aspiration as well as the intent to dis-
criminate are quite a bit more complicated than that, regulated as they 
are by the hidden and perpetuated injuries of racist words. The black 
power movement notwithstanding, I think many, many people of 
color still find it extremely difficult to admit, much less prove, our 
desire to be included in alien and hostile organizations and institu-
tions, even where those institutions also represent economic opportu-
nity. I think, moreover, that even where that desire to be included is 
acknowledged, the schematic leads to a simultaneous act of race-abdi-
cation and self-denial. 
Last January, for example, on the day after Dr. Martin Luther 
King's birthday, the New York Times featured a story that illustrates 
as well as anything the paradoxical, self-perpetuating logic of this form 
of subordination and so-called neutrality. In Hackensack, New 
Jersey, African-American residents resisted efforts to rename their 
street after Dr. King because it would signal to "anyone opening up 
the Yellow Pages" that it was a black neighborhood. It was feared 
that no white person would ever want to live there, and that property 
values would drop. "It stigmatizes an area."33 
The Hackensack story struck a familiar chord with me. I grew up 
32. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 729-30 (1989). 
33. Winerip, A City Struggles Over an Honor for Dr. King, N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1988, at Bl, 
col. 1. 
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among the clutter of such opinions, just such uprisings of voices, riot-
ous, enraged, middle-class, picky, testy, living and brash. Our house 
was in Boston on the edge of the predominantly black section of 
Roxbury; for years the people on my street fought and argued about 
whether they were really in Roxbury or whether they were close 
enough to be considered part of the (then) predominantly white neigh-
borhood of Jamaica Plain. 
It seems to me that the "stigmatum" of "Dr. Martin Luther King 
Boulevard" or "Roxbury" is reflective of a deep personal discomfort 
among blacks, a wordless and tabooed sense of self that is identical to 
the discomfort shared by both blacks and whites in even mentioning 
words like "black" and "race" in mixed company. Neutrality is from 
this perspective a suppression, an institutionalization of psychic taboos 
as much as segregation was the institutionalization of physical bounda-
ries. What the middle-class, propertied, upwardly mobile black striver 
must do, to accommodate a race-neutral world view, is to become an 
invisible black, a phantom-black, by avoiding the label "black" (it's 
OK to be black in this reconfigured world as long as you keep quiet 
about it) because the words of race and the knowledge and contro-
versy they bear are like windows into the most private vulnerable parts 
of the self; the world looks in, and the world will know by the awe-
some, horrific revelation of a name. 
I remember with great clarity the moment I discovered that I was 
"colored." I was three. I already knew that I was a "negro"; my 
parents had told me to be proud of that. But "colored" was something 
else; it was the totemic evil I had heard my little white friends talking 
about for several weeks before I finally realized that I was one of them. 
I still remember the crash of that devastating moment of union, the 
union of my joyful body and the terrible power-life of that devouring 
symbol of negritude. I have spent the rest of my life recovering from 
the degradation of being divided against myself, within myself; I am 
still trying to overcome the polarity of my own vulnerability. The 
tense poised trembling whirling joy of my mortality. The immortal 
unrelenting finality of my dangerous bottomless black fate. 
Into this breach of the division-within-ourselves falls the helpless-
ness of our fragile humanity. Unfortunately, the degree to which it is 
somewhat easier in the short run to climb out of the pit by denying the 
mountain labelled "colored" than it is to tackle the sheer and risky 
cliff that is our scorned mortality, is the degree to which blacks inter-
nalize the mountain labelled colored. It is the degree to which blacks 
remain divided along all sorts of categories of blackness, including 
class, turning the speech of helplessness upon ourselves like a fire hose. 
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We should do something with ourselves, say the mothers to the daugh-
ters and the sons to the fathers, we should do something. So we rub 
ointments on our skin and pull at our hair and wrap our bodies in silk 
and gold. We remake and redo and we sing and we pray that the 
ugliness will be hidden and that our beauty will shine through like 
light and be accepted. And we work and we work and we work at 
ourselves. Against ourselves. In spite of ourselves, and in subordina-
tion of ourselves. 
And we resent those of us who do not do the same. We resent 
those who are not well-groomed and well-masked, and have not reined 
in the grubbiness of their anger, who have not sought the shelter of the 
best assimilation we know how, the most decorative denial-art forms. 
So confusing are the "colored" labels, so easily do they masquerade as 
real people, that we frequently mistake the words for one another. 
When segregation was eradicated from the American lexicon, its 
omission led many to actually believe that racism therefore no longer 
existed. Race-neutrality in law was the presumed antidote for race 
bias in real life. With the entrenchment of the notion of race-neutral-
ity came attacks on the concept of affirmative action and the rise of 
reverse discrimination suits. Blacks, for so many generations deprived 
of jobs based on the color of our skin, are now told that we ought to 
find it demeaning to be hired based on the color of our skin. Such is 
the silliness of simplistic either-or inversions as remedies to complex 
problems. 
What is truly demeaning in this era of double-speak-no-evil is go-
ing on interviews and not getting hired because someone doesn't think 
we'll be comfortable. It is demeaning not to be promoted because 
we're judged "too weak," then putting in a lot of energy the next time 
and getting fired because we're "too strong." It is demeaning to be 
told what we find demeaning. It is very demeaning to stand on street 
comers unemployed and begging. It is downright demeaning to have 
to explain why we haven't been employed for months and then watch 
the job go to someone who is "more experienced." It is outrageously 
demeaning that none of this can be called racism, even if it happens to 
disproportionately large numbers of black people; as long as it's done 
with a smile, a handshake and a shrug; as long as the phantom-word 
"race" is never used. 
The image of race as a phantom-word came to me after I moved 
into my late godmother's home. In a respectful attempt to make it my 
own, I cleared the bedroom for painting. The following morning the 
room asserted itself, came rushing and raging at me through the emp-
tiness, exactly as it had been for twenty-five years. One day filled with 
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profusion and overwhelming complexity, the next day filled with per-
sistently recurring memories. The shape of the past came to haunt me, 
the shape of the emptiness confronted me each time I was about to 
enter the room. The force of its spirit still drifts like an odor through-
out the house. 
The power of that room, I have thought since, is very like the 
power of racism as status quo: it is deep, angry, eradicated from view, 
but strong enough to make everyone who enters the room walk around 
the bed that isn't there, avoiding the phantom as they did the sub-
stance, for fear of bodily harm. They do not even know they are 
avoiding; they defer to the unseen shapes of things with subtle respon-
siveness, guided by an impulsive awareness of nothingness, and the 
deep knowledge and denial of witchcraft at work. 
The phantom room is to me symbolic of the emptiness of what 
formal equal opportunity as promised has actually turned out to be. It 
is the creation of a space that is filled in by a meandering stream of 
unguided hopes, dreams, fantasies, fears, recollections. It is the pres-
ence of the past in imaginary, imagistic form. What is required in the 
law of opportunity is some acknowledgement of the room as an empty 
room before we can stop filling the void with the perpetuated racism of 
the past. The law must see the room for its actuality as an empty 
room before we can stop filling it with unfulfilled promises of the fu-
ture. The real room must be filled with the actuality of our vision, and 
our wisdom - not the phantom-roomed exile of our longing. 
My dispute is perhaps not with formal equal opportunity at all. 
So-called formal equal opportunity has done a lot but misses the heart 
of the problem. It put the vampire back in its coffin, but it was no 
silver stake. The rules may be color-blind but people are not. The 
question remains, therefore, whether the law can truly shed, or exist 
apart from the color-conscious society in which it exists, as a skeleton 
is devoid of flesh; or whether law is the embodiment of society, either 
the creation or the reflection of a particular citizenry's arranged com-
plexity of relations. 
All this is to say I strongly believe in the efficacy not just of pro-
grams like affirmative action but affirmative action as a socially and 
professionally pervasive concept. Not because blacks or women - or 
anyone - can prove we are holy in our suffering, but because black 
individuality is subsumed in a social circumstance - an idea, a stereo-
type - that pins us to the underside of this society and keeps us there, 
out of sight and out of mind - out of the knowledge of mind which is 
law. Blacks and women are the objects of a constitutional omission 
which has been incorporated into a theory of neutrality. It is thus that 
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omission is really a form of expression, as oxymoronic as that sounds: 
racial omission is a literal part of original intent; it is the fixed, reiter-
ated prophecy of the Founding Fathers. It is thus that affirmative ac-
tion is an affirmation; the affirmative act of hiring - or heari~g -
blacks is a recognition of individuality that re-places blacks as a social 
statistic, that is profoundly interconnective to the fate of blacks and 
whites and women and men either as subgroups of each other or as 
one group. Affirmative action in this sense is as mystical and beyond-
the-self as an initiation ceremony. It is an act of verification and of 
vision; an act of social as well as professional responsibility. 
V. THE TRUTH ABOUT TRUTH 
In the last ten or fifteen years, there has been increasing movement 
to expand racial paradigms beyond what has been discussed in the first 
parts of this essay. A standard allowing increased differentiation, and 
celebrating "difference," is more frequently touted as a desirable social 
norm. This is, I think, very much like yet another shift in the sausage-
machine analogy, from the second level of "partial integration" to the 
third level, where whole new worlds of meaning are allowed to coexist, 
and to contradict one another. In this happily cacophonous universe, 
white is white and white is good, and black is good and black is really 
black. 
I think that it is this paradigm that has given us so many of the 
instructional and cultural diversity experiments, in academia as else-
where - such as Stanford's theme houses. Soul food nights. Salsa 
dances. Or, at one institution with which I was associated, even Real 
White Men's Day, celebrated on the occasion of the first blizzard of 
the season. (Real White Men would go out to the parking lot, set up 
grills, and barbecue Real Red Meat in their shirtsleeves. We, the rest 
of the community, would be there rooting them on from the warmth 
of the cafeteria, always ready to acknowledge anyone's difference, but 
most particularly theirs.) 
All of this is good, with the possible problem that in the exclusive 
celebration of difference, difference becomes a property launching us 
back into a complicated version of the first level of parol-evidence-
sausage, so that: if white is good and black is good and white and 
black are different, then goodness must be different for each - or 
goodness becomes a limited property which is the subject of intense 
competition, as though it were some physical thing, a commodity or 
object whose possession can know only one location. 
I think, by the way, that this latter is pure silliness - goodness, 
like humanity, is a concept full of generosity and delights in its multi-
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plicity of voice, and grows strong with each different manifestation. 
But silly though it may be, it is, again, an attitude that is quite power-
ful and very pervasive in law, and in society. 
Let me give you an example, shifting from race to gender, of how 
this third-level "difference" can get complicated and overlap with first-
level exclusion of the "extrinsic." Once upon a time, when I was liv-
ing in California, I had a student, S., who was very unhappy being a 
man. S. came to me and informed me of his intention to become a 
woman. He said he wanted to talk to me before anyone else at the 
school because I was black, and that as a black person, I might be 
more understanding. I had never thought about transsexuality at al1;34 
I remember finding myself at a complete loss for words. 
After the sex-change operation, S. began to use the ladies room. 
There was enormous outcry from women students of all political per-
suasions, who "felt raped" - in addition to the more academic asser-
tions of some, who "feared rape." In a complicated blizzard of 
homophobia, the men of the student body let it be known that they too 
"feared rape," and vowed to chase her out of any and all men's rooms. 
Ultimately, the oppositional forces of men and women reached a com-
promise. S. should use the dean's bathroom. Alas, in the dean's bath-
room, no resolution was to be found, for indeed the suggestion had not 
been an honest one, but merely an integration of the fears of each side. 
Thus, in his tum, the dean, circumspection having gotten him this far 
in life, expressed polite, well-modulated fears about "the appearance of 
impropriety" in having "students" visit his inner sanctum, and a 
bunch of other things that I think were related to fear of a real com-
promise of hierarchy. 
I remember thinking about how peculiar and revealing were the 
scripts that people shook in the face of poor S. Gender as property. 
Gender as privilege. Hierarchy as sexualized oppression. "I am not a 
homosexual," I remember S. crying out at one point in the middle of 
all that mess. 
Those words echo in me still. She was "not homosexual" first and 
foremost as to her best friend, a man with whom she was in love and 
for whom she had had the operation. She was not homosexual as to 
the women, whose outcry she took for fear of lesbianism. She was not 
homosexual as to the men, for this would have been an ultimate be-
trayal of her bitter, hard-won love. She was not homosexual as to the 
34. I have tried to do a fair amount of reading on the subject since. I by no means want to 
imply, in my recounting ofS., any implication that this was all there was to her story, or that her 
story explains transsexuality. I want most explicitly to acknowledge a range of transsexuality 
beyond S. herself, as well as an S. who exists beyond my limited characterization or experience of 
her. 
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dean, as though this bit of clarity would save him from some embar-
rassment, or reassure him that his power or status would not be low-
ered by the ambivalence of her identity. 
At the vortex of this torment, S. as human being who needed to go 
to the bathroom was lost. Devoured by others, she carved and shaped 
herself to be definitionally acceptable. She aspired to a notion of wo-
men set like jewels in grammatical mountings, fragile and display-en-
cased. She had not learned what society's tricksters and dark fringes 
have had to, in order to survive: to invert, to hollow and to stretch 
meaning, rather than oneself. She to whom words meant so much, 
was not given the room to appropriate them into warm skins and 
protective shields. S. as "transsexual," S. as "not homosexual," thus 
became mere floating signifier, a deconstructive polymorph par ex-
cellence. 
In retrospect, I see clearly the connection between S.'s fate and my 
being black, her coming to me because I was black. S.'s experience 
was a sort of Jim Crow mentality applied to gender.35 Lots of men, 
women, blacks and certainly anyone who self-identifies with the term 
"white" are caught up in the perpetuation and invisible privilege of 
this game; for "black," "female," "male," and "white" are every bit as 
much "properties" as the buses, private clubs, neighborhoods and 
schools which provide the extra-corporeal battlegrounds of their ex-
pression. S.'s experience, indeed, was a reminder of the extent to 
which property is nothing more than the mind's enhancement of the 
body's limitation. (This is true to some extent in all cultures, I think, 
but particularly in ours, where our possessions become the description 
of who we are and the reflection of our worth; and where land usually 
35. When they changed trains in Birmingham for the last leg of the trip, they discovered 
what luxury they had been in through Kentucky and Tennessee, where the rest stops had all 
had colored toilets. After Birmingham there were none. Helene's face was drawn with the 
need to relieve herself, and so intense was her distress she finally brought herself to speak to 
a black woman with four children who had got on in Tuscaloosa: 
"Is there somewhere we can go to use the restroom?" 
The woman looked up at her and seemed not to understand. ~'Ma'am?" Her eyes fast-
ened on the thick velvet collar, the fair skin, the high-tone voice. 
"The restroom," Helene repeated. Then, in a whisper, "The toilet." 
The woman pointed out the window and said, "Yes, ma'am. Yonder." 
Helene looked out of the window hal!Way expecting to see a comfort station in the dis-
tance; instead she saw gray-green trees leaning over tangled grass. "Where?" 
"Yonder," the woman said. "Meridian .... " 
At Meridian the women got out with their children. While Helene looked about the 
stationhouse for a door that said COLORED WOMEN, the other woman stalked off to a 
field of high grass on the far side of the track. Some white men were leaning on the railing 
in front of the stationhouse. It was not only their tongues curling around toothpicks that 
kept Helene from asking information of them. She looked around for the other woman and, 
seeing just the top of her head rag in the grass, slowly realized where "yonder" was. 
T. MORRISON, SULA 23-24 (1974). 
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is referred to not for or by its use, but by the name of its owner (i.e., 
Queens, Victoria, Washington, Pennsylvania)- as though the greater 
the expanse of an estate, the greater in personhood will its master 
become.) 
Another dimension of my resistance was that, for me, the property 
of my blackness was all about my struggle to define myself as "some-
body." Into the middle of that struggle, S. was coming to me because 
others had defined her as "nobody." Initially, it felt as though she 
were seeking in me the comfort of another nobody; I was a bit put off 
inside by the implication that my distinctive somebody-ness was being 
ignored; I felt in some way that I was being used, an apparency of me 
being rendered invisible through her refusal to see all of me. (In fact, 
in the suits and situations that give rise to the question of whether all-
black and all-women's organizations should admit whites and men, I 
often feel as though there is a good deal of just such "I'm lonely there-
fore I'm oppressed too" presumptiveness, that treats such organiza-
tions not just as access to power or collegiality, but as empty 
wilderness to be filled in by the mere comfort of belonging just for 
belonging's sake; it is thus that the desire to become "one" often dis-
guises appropriation for the mere sake of convenience and the denial 
of real difference; it is thus that this sometimes noble sentiment comes 
very close to perpetuating a quite demeaning form of paternalism.) 
Very quickly, however, I realized that a literal designation of 
"black" in my self-definition was probably not appropriate in this situ-
ation. While all of the above may be true, I realized that a simultane-
ous truth existed also: that a discursive property of black somebody-
ness was being part of a community of souls who had experienced 
being permanently invisible nobodies; that "black" was a designation 
for those who had no place else to go; that we were both nobody and 
somebody at the same time, if for different purposes. 
This is not an easy concept, I think. I am not saying that my 
blackness is unimportant, or not different. Under other circumstances 
it might be presumptuous for S. to "become black" in effect, or for me 
to feel obligated to stretch the definition to include her. 
What I am saying is that my difference was in some ways the same 
as her difference; and that simultaneously her difference was in some 
ways very different from my difference, and that simultaneously we 
were in all ways the same. 
VI. CONCLUSION: IN WHICH ALL THINGS ARE ONE, THINGS 
FALL APART, AND NOTHING Is EVER THE SAME 
Not long ago, a white acquaintance of mine described a boyfriend 
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of hers as "having a bit of the Jewish in him." She meant that he was 
stingy with money. I said, "Oh, don't talk like that! I know you 
didn't mean it that way, but I think that there are harmful implications 
from thinking like that." She responded with profuse apologies, phone 
calls, tears, then anger. She said repeatedly that she had no wish to 
offend me or anyone: that it was just a cultural reality, that there was 
no offense in it, and that she had heard Jewish people say the same 
thing, that it was just the way things were, just a group characteristic, 
nothing personal. There was an odd moment in all this at which I 
thought we were in agreement, when she said she was sorry, that it 
was '1ust cultural reality": I thought that she was referring to racism 
being so deeply imbedded in culture that it was unconscious, but what 
she meant was that stinginess was a Jewish "thing." 
As we argued, words like "overly sensitive," "academic privilege," 
and "touchy" began to creep into her description of me. She accused 
me of building walls, of being unrealistic, of not being able to loosen 
up and just be with people. She did not use the word "righteous" but I 
know that that is what she meant. I listened and we talked; I tried to 
reassure her that I did not mean to put her on the defensive, that I had 
not meant to attack or upset her, and that I deeply valued her friend-
ship. But I did not back down. 
Eventually I felt our friendship being broken apart. She would be 
consoled with nothing less than a retraction of my opinion, an admis-
sion that I was wrong. She did not want me to understand merely that 
she meant no harm, she wanted me to confess ultimately that there 
was no harm. Moreover, I realized that she perceived the very raising 
of the subject matter as an act of hostility, while I perceived my men-
tion of it as an attempt to take our friendship to newer and franker 
levels of conversation, risking showing what was truly important to 
me. 
About this time, my sister sent me an article about the difficulties 
of blacks and whites discussing racial issues in social settings. It in-
cluded warnings of Shelby Steele, a black professor of English at San 
Jose State University ("If you are honest and frank, then you may 
come to be seen as belligerent, arrogant, a troublemaker"), 36 and the 
advice of Harvard professor Dr. Alvin Poussaint ("Defuse the situa-
tion; devise a way of getting out of it very quickly. Develop some 
humorous responses ... and take charge by steering the conversation 
in another direction.")37 
36. Williams, Uneasy Mingling: When Small Talk at Parties Tackles Large Racial Issues, 
N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1988, at AlS, col. 1. 
37. Id. 
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Not long after that, I went shopping for a sweatshirt in the empti-
ness of nearly-closing-time at Au Coton, a clothing store near my 
home. The three young salespeople told me that the waffie weave 
sweater would make me look "really fly." I told them that I'm too old 
to be fly. The young woman closest to me persisted: "Well, all the 
really fly people are wearing waffie weave." 
As I continued to shop, I could hear them laughing among them-
selves. It wasn't until I came closer to the counter that I realized that 
they were joking about Jews. They laughed about "princesses" and 
imitated "Jewish" accents - New Yorkers imitating other New 
Yorkers. To an outsider like me, they sounded like they were imitat-
ing themselves. 
"Speak of the devil," said one of them as four other young people 
came into the store. I don't know why the three young salespeople 
had decided that the four newcomers were Jews - again, it was as 
though they were pointing fingers at themselves. They all wore waffie 
weave tops. They wore denim jackets with the collars turned up. 
They wore their hair in little moussed spikes and lacquered ringlets. 
Each and every one of them wore a colorful little kerchief knotted at 
their throats. 
"Tell that girl to get a job," murmured one of the salesgirls of one 
of the new girls. There was both playfulness and scorn in her voice. 
Her friends tittered. 
The designated Jews wandered around the store, held clothes on 
hangers up to their chins, and generally looked as youthfully fly as 
could be. 
One of the salesgirls said, "Can I help you guys?" Her voice was 
high-pitched and eager. Then she turned her head and, behind their 
backs, winked at her friends. 
I didn't say anything. I wanted to say something, and since I am 
usually very outspoken about these things, I was surprised when no 
words came out. It is embarrassing but worthwhile nonetheless, I 
think, to run through all the mundane, even quite petty components of 
the self-consciousness that resulted in my silence. I think such silence 
is too common, too institutionalized, and too destructive not to ex-
amine it in the most nuanced way possible. 
My self-consciousness, I think, was a powerful paralyzer. I was 
self-conscious about being so much older than they. I was afraid of 
sounding so maternally querulous that they would dismiss my words, 
not hear their substance. 
I was self-conscious, too, about shopping in a store that had pos-
ters that said "As advertised in Seventeen magazine .... " As old as I 
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was, I felt very young again - young in a sticky, tongue-tied awful 
adolescent way. In some odd way that is extremely hard to admit in 
print, I wanted their approval. I was on the edge of their group, the 
odd person out (as I always was as a teen - that time in one's life 
when one's attitudes about everything social, including race, are most 
powerfully reinforced). I did not want to be part of them, but I did 
not want to be the object of their derision, either. The whole room 
was filled with adolescent vanity, social pressure and a yearning to 
belong. The room was ablaze with the cross fire of self-assertive 
groupings. The four who wandered in, preening and posing and pos-
turing, pretending self-confidence. The three who worked there, 
lounging and diffident, pretending they owned the place. It was like 
meeting up with a smoking gun; for those brief, childish, powerful mo-
ments, I wasn't sure I could survive being on the wrong side. 
I was also caught short because they were so open about their anti-
semitism. They smiled at me and commented on the clothing I was 
looking at; they smiled and commented on the clothing being looked 
at by the others. Their anti-Semitism was smiling, open, casually jocu-
lar, and only slightly conspiratorial or secretive. They were such nice 
young people; how could they possible mean any harm? This little 
piece of cognitive dissonance was aided and abetted by my blackness, 
by the fact that I am black: I grew up in a neighborhood where blacks 
were the designated Jews. I can think of few instances, therefore, in 
which I have ever directly heard the heart, the source, the uncensored, 
undramatic day-to-day core of it - heard it as people think it, and 
heard it from the position of an "insider." And it was irresistible, for-
bidden, almost sexually thrilling to be on the inside. 
I have, of course, heard the message too often to recount as an 
outsider, by words or acts ranging from hostile to insincere to uncon-
scious. But this time, the salespeople drew their circle with me on the 
inside. I was "privileged" to hear what they really thought. I was 
earmarked as someone who would not reveal them; I was designated 
"safe." I was also designated as someone who didn't matter. 
What they had constructed around me was the architecture of 
trust. As strange as it sounds, I realized that breaking the bond of my 
silence was like breaking the bond of our silence, was like breaking the 
heart of a friend. At the same time, I realized that the very fact of 
their faith in me was oppressively insulting. I became an anti-Semite 
by the stunning audacity of their assumption that I would remain si-
lent. If I was "safe" I was also "easy" in my desire for the illusion of 
inclusion, in my capitulation to the vanity of mattering enough even to 
be included. It did not occur to me that I was simply ignored. I could 
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have been Jewish as much as the four random souls who wandered 
into the store; but by their designation of me as "not Jewish" they 
made property of me, as they made wilderness of the others. I became 
colonized as their others were made enemies. 
I left a small piece of myself on the outside, beyond the rim of their 
circle. I was those others on the other side of the store; as they made 
fun of the others, they also made light of me; I was watching myself be 
made fun of. I became "them." In this way, I transformed myself 
into the third person; I undermined the security of my most precious 
property, "I." It would be a long time before I would be able to trust 
"I" in the same way again; I would give much power to the wilderness 
of strangers, some few of whom I would feel as reflections of my lost 
property by being able to snare them in the strong bear traps of my 
own familiarizing labels. 38 
I have thought a lot about this incident since. Part of my reaction 
was premised on the peculiarities of my own history. Although I was 
quite young, I remember the Woolworth's sit-ins; I remember my fa-
ther walking trepidatiously into stores in Savannah, Georgia, shortly 
after desegregation, cautiously disbelieving of his right to be there, dis-
proportionately grateful for the allowance to just be. Very much my 
father's daughter, I am always grateful when storekeepers are polite to 
me; I do not expect courtesy. I value it in a way that resembles love, 
that resembles trust. I value it in a way that is like finding shelter. I 
value it in a way that is frequently misleading, for it is neither love nor 
trust nor shelter. 
I know that this valuing is a form of fear. I am afraid of being 
alien, of being suspect, of being thrown out at any moment; I am re-
lieved when I am not. At the same time, I am enraged by the possibil-
ity of this subsurface drama-waiting-to-happen. My rage feels 
dangerous, trapped by necessity, full of physical violence, like some-
thing that will get me arrested. And at the same time I am embar-
rassed by all these feelings, ashamed to reveal in them, through their 
frequent disproportion, the truth of my insignificance. 
All this impermissible danger floating around in me, so boiling, so 
exhausting. I can't kill. I can't teach everyone. I can't pretend it 
doesn't bother me; it eats me alive. There is no place to dump this 
toxic rage. So I protect myself. I don't venture into the market very 
38. The corollary of historiographic metafiction's challenge to the realist assumption of the 
transitivity of language and of narrative as an unmediated way to represent history (or some 
reality that exists outside the discourse) is its challenge to the traditional transparency of the 
first-person pronoun as a reflection of subjectivity and of the third-person pronoun as the 
guarantee of objectivity. 
L. HUTCHEON, A POETICS OF POSTMODERNISM: HISTORY, THEORY, FICTION 177 (1988). 
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often. I don't deal with other people if I can help it. I don't risk 
exposing myself to the rage that will get me arrested. 
The dilemma, and the distance between the "I" on this side of the 
store and the me that is "them" on the other side of the store, is 
marked by an emptiness in myself. Frequently such emptiness is reit-
erated by a hole in language, by a gap in the law, or a chasm of fear. 
I think that the hard work of a non-racist sensibility is the bound-
ary-crossing, from safe circle into that wilderness: the testing of 
boundary, the consecration of sacrilege. The willingness to spoil a 
good party and break an encompassing circle, to travel from the safe 
to the unsafe. It is the courage to realize something beyond bounds. 
The transgression is dizzyingly intense, a reminder of what it is to be 
alive. It is a sinful pleasure, this willing transgression of a line, that 
takes one into new and heightened awareness, a secret, lonely and 
tabooed world - to survive that transgression is terrifying and addic-
tive. To know that everything has changed and yet that nothing has 
changed; and in leaping the chasm of this impossible division of the 
self, a discovery of the self surviving, still well, still strong, and, as a 
curious consequence, renewed. 
But as I said earlier, I think that the perspective we must learn to 
acquire is one beyond these three boxes that have been set up. 'It is a 
perspective that exists on all three levels and eighty-five more levels 
besides - simultaneously. 
It is this perspective, the ambi-valent, multivalent way of seeing 
that is, I think, at the heart of what is called critical theory, feminist 
theory, and the so-called minority critique. It has to do with a fluid 
positioning that sees back and forth across boundary, that acknowl-
edges that in certain circumstances I can be black and good and black 
and bad, a,nd that I can also be black and white, male and female, yin 
and yang, love and hate. 
Nothing is simple. Each day is a new labor. 
Ursula Le Guin, in her novel, The Lathe of Heaven, writes that 
making love is like baking bread: each time it must be done with care 
and from the beginning. 39 
Each day is a new labor. 
39. U. LE GUIN, THE LATHE OF HEAVEN 158 (1971). 
